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Executive Summary 
Overview: The United States Coast Guard’s International Port Security (IPS) Program is the 
primary port security assessment office and was established in 2003 as part of the U.S. Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) to reduce risks to U.S. ports and ships, and to the entire 
maritime transport system. Through the assessment of International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code implementation and other measures in foreign ports, the International Port 
Security Program can determine whether or not there is a reasonable and acceptable level of port 
security at any given foreign port. This report is comprised of qualitative and quantitative 
research along with two case studies that compare and contrast two countries and/or ports that 
either succeeded or failed in complying with this program and received a Port Security Advisory 
(PSA).  
Hypothesis: Port Security Advisories (PSA) are issued when a port does not meet the 
International Port Security Program code. They are an instrument to build and sustain port 
security practices and improvements. PSAs can give standard regulations for those who use ports 
in compliance with a PSA as well as create maritime security protocols for other countries that 
do not have strong port standards. As for the economic impacts, there can be both positive and 
negative factors depending on the country and the situation. However, we hypothesize that 
overall, PSAs do not significantly influence a country’s volume of trade. Due to non-compliant 
countries in reporting, there is no discernable method for tracking or ensuring restrictions.   
Methodology: We will observe quantitative measures of trade to identify negative impacts 
associated with the issuance of PSAs. We will also look at quantitative data to identify positive 
impacts associated with PSAs. We will be using USCG’s HOMEPORT website to identify the 
PSAs and use COMTRADE to examine trade both before and after a PSA was issued. Trade will 
be compared to similar countries, those which have not received a PSA. Lastly, we will go over 
local and regional factors and determine what is currently working and what needs to be 
improved.  
Conclusions: Our conclusion is that as a system the PSA process is not necessary an influence 
on trade. There may be correlations between countries with PSAs issued and changes in trade but 
there are a myriad of other factors that can impact this making the current methodology less than 
definitive. There also may be certain countries and/or ports where the correlation appears 
stronger (See Case Study #1); but overall, our conclusion is that PSAs have a negligible impact 
on a country receiving them in influencing their volume of trade. 
Recommendations have been developed to try to clarify the data that would make this process 
more effective.  
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Situation 
 Since September 11th, 2001 there has been an increasing concern about weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and other dangerous components that could cause serious harm. The private 
sector plays a significant role in this concern because they are often the groups manufacturing 
and transporting individual packages that could potentially be used as a weapon if it were to get 
into the wrong hands.  In order to prevent such an incident, both the private and the public 
sectors must have a functional relationship. That relationship today around the world, not just in 
the U.S., is not where it should be and is often riddled with suspicion and animosity towards one 
another. In order to prevent a future incident, lawmakers are requesting harsher regulations 
including increased port security, tighter export regulations, and a variety of other preventative 
measures. These types of increased measures are often difficult to follow for the private sector. 
The government and lawmakers are so focused on preventing a future terrorist incident that they 
often do not see they are causing more harm to corporate interests instead1. In order to protect 
the world from potential dangers, there should be a healthy, established balance between the 
private and public sectors.  
The United States has a multitude of maritime ports in which it conducts business in 
importing goods, exporting goods, and transportation- all via direct ocean border location or 
seaway access.  With 182 ports handling over 250,000 tons of waterborne activity annually, 
these being the large ports only, mostly commodity dealings, there is a significant amount of 
1 Finlay, Brian (2009, February 18). Minding Our Business: The Role of the Private Sector in Managing the WMD 
Supply Chain. Retrieved November 2016.  
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product tonnage being brought in and out of the United States.2 There are various ways to 
measure which ports are central to maritime activity in our nation.  
Port traffic is measured in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), which refers to the 
standard size container. Ports in the US fall under an array of jurisdictions to include federal, 
state, local, public port authority entities, port navigation districts, and/or municipal port 
departments, all while still accommodating some international and foreign regulatory measures 
to ensure agreed upon trade practice. 
Public ports work closely with the private industry both in the development and financing 
of marine terminals and other maritime-related facilities. The alignment of public and private 
interests determines the structure of port management and port development policies. They are 
used to manage port operations more efficiently and effectively. Although the private sector does 
not generally provide port security, they purchase and install their own equipment and are 
responsible for terminal operations.  
2 Navigation and Civil Works Decision Support Center U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (2015, July 15). The 
U.S.Waterway System Transportation Facts & Information 2014. Retrieved November 11, 2015. 
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Legislation/Policy 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a specialized agency within the United 
Nations created specifically to improve the safety and security of global trade and shipping. 
Because shipping is an international industry, it is important for the United Nations and the IMO 
to adopt security and safety standards for all member nations to follow. Created in 1948 in 
Geneva, the IMO’s purpose is to adopt and promote legislation, not enforce it. There are 
currently 171 member nations of IMO, and it is up to the governments of the member countries 
to make this legislation part of their own national laws and enforce it. In the 1970s, the IMO 
adopted a new and improved version of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS). This became the world’s most important treaty for maritime shipping safety and 
security3.  
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) was adopted in 
November 1974. SOLAS created minimum safety and security standards for the building and 
operation of ships and port facilities. SOLAS was also later amended to include a special section 
dedicated to enhancing maritime safety and security4. This section is called the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).  
On September 11, 2001, the world was changed forever when terrorists attacked New 
York City and Washington, D.C., and crashed a plane into a Pennsylvania field. Since the 
terrorists used commercial airliners, the fear was that other modes of transportation could be 
attacked or weaponized for use by terrorists. In October 2002, those fears were realized when 
3 International Maritime Organization. (2016). “About IMO: Introduction to IMO.” Retrieved from 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx 
4 International Maritime Organization. (2016). “International Convention for the Safety of Life at  Sea (SOLAS), 
1974.” International Maritime Organization List of Conventions. Retrieved from 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-
Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx. 
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terrorists attacked the French tanker, the Limburg, in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Yemen. 
Officials believe terrorists rammed the ship with a small boat armed with explosives, causing a 
large explosion that damaged the ship, killed one crew member, and spilled tens of thousands of 
gallons of oil into the Gulf of Aden5. These terror attacks brought scrutiny and attention to the 
need for stricter safety and security measures across different modes of transportation and trade, 
including international shipping.  
After the terror attacks of 2001 and 2002, the International Maritime Organization 
amended SOLAS to include new comprehensive guidelines for safety and security in 
international shipping6. The amendment, the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
(ISPS Code), is a set of guidelines for a comprehensive mandatory security system for global and 
international shipping. It is divided into two sections, Part A and Part B. The first explains the 
maritime and port security requirements that are mandatory for all nations, ports, and companies. 
Part B gives a set of recommendations on how to meet the requirements laid out in Part A. 
Essentially, the ISPS Code establishes an international framework to assess and detect threats to 
ships and ports, develops roles and responsibilities for all parties, provides a standard 
methodology for completing security assessments, and ensures that security measures in place 
are adequate.  
The United States has been a member of the International Maritime Organization since 
19507. All IMO member nations are required to adopt IMO legislation as part of their own 
national laws and enforce them as well. The United States included the IMO’s SOLAS and ISPS 
5 BBC News. (October 16, 2002). “Yemen says tanker blast was terrorism.” BBC News World Edition: Middle East. 
Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2334865.stm. 
6 International Maritime Organization. (2016). “About IMO: Introduction to IMO.” Retrieved from 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx. 
7 International Maritime Organization. (2016). “About IMO: Introduction to IMO.” Retrieved from 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx 
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Code within the U.S. Code. The U.S. Code is the official compilation of all laws passed in the 
United States. Title 33 U.S. Code Chapter 1 implements the IMO’s safety and security 
regulations found in SOLAS and the ISPS Code. The U.S. Code also ensures that the United 
States enforces SOLAS and ISPS Code requirements in a way that is compatible internationally 
and in a way that does not compromise the safety and security of the United States8. The U.S. 
Code chapter including SOLAS and ISPS Code also contains a law passed by the United States 
after the terror attacks on September 11, 2001.  
Public Law 107-295, or the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, was 
passed in November 2002 to amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. The Merchant Marine 
Act of 1936 was the most current law the U.S. had in regards to safety and security in U.S. ports 
until the MTSA. A lot changed in the United States between 1936 and 2002. For instance, in 
2002, there were 361 public ports in the United States. These ports handle a variety of different 
types of trade including bulk cargo, containerized cargo, passenger transport, tourism, and many 
others. Due to their importance to international trade and the national economy, ports have 
frequently been the targets of various crimes such as drug trafficking, cargo theft, smuggling, 
and human trafficking, amongst others. Ports have constant traffic of cargo, equipment, and 
people, and they are often vulnerable and exposed to the elements, making them susceptible to 
threats. The goals of the MTSA are to increase United States port security while ensuring 
efficiency of shipping and trade. The MTSA helped to strengthen security requirements, invest in 
safety and security technology, increase collection of intelligence, support counter terrorism and 
law enforcement efforts, and much more9.  
8 Title 33 US Code Chapter 1 (from GPO) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2003-title33-vol1/content-
detail.html 
9 Public Law 107-295 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (also from GPO) 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ295/pdf/PLAW-107publ295.pdf 
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The MTSA was in part due to the fact that the IMO was also trying to strengthen maritime 
security legislation after the terror attacks in 2001 and 2002. To parallel the IMO’s strengthening 
of legislation, the United States decided it was imperative to improve safety and security 
legislation as well. Perhaps one of the most important parts of the MTSA is the creation of the 
Foreign Port Assessment program. The Foreign Port Assessment program allows the Secretary 
of the Department of Homeland Security to assess the effectiveness of safety, security, and 
counter terrorism requirements at overseas ports.  
When conducting these assessments, the Secretary must consider: 
• Screening of cargo and baggage;
• Physical security/ restricted access to cargo, vessels, and dockside property;
• Additional security at ports and on vessels;
• Compliance certifications;
• Foreign port security management program;
• Counter terrorism measures10.
The Secretary of Homeland Security, who is the principal federal officer in charge of the 
United States Coast Guard, is responsible for several components with Foreign Port 
Assessments. The Secretary must discuss the involved countries with the Secretary of Defense 
and the Secretary of State in order to identify which foreign ports have a high terror threat to 
international shipping and commerce. If the Secretary completes a Foreign Port Assessment on 
countries identified as a threat by the Secretaries of State or Defense, and consequently finds 
inadequate counter terrorism measures, the Secretary must notify the Departments of State and 
Defense immediately11.  
10 Public Law 107-295 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (also from GPO) 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ295/pdf/PLAW-107publ295.pdf 
11 Public Law 107-295 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (also from GPO) 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ295/pdf/PLAW-107publ295.pdf 
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In the event that a country’s security measures are found “inadequate” by the Secretary, the 
Secretary is allowed to implement ‘conditions of entry’ on all ships going to or coming from that 
port. The Secretary may also deny entry to any vessels that originated or passed through a port 
with inadequate security measures12. If the Secretary deems that a country is insecure or 
inadequate in meeting international security standards, the Secretary must notify both the 
government of the foreign country as well as the U.S. State Department.  
Perhaps the most important aspect of these assessments are that the Secretary may publish 
Port Security Advisories (PSAs) listing conditions of entry or denial of entry for ports that are 
deemed inadequate. These Port Security Advisories and potential sanctions generally take effect 
90 days after notification of the foreign government, unless the foreign government immediately 
complies and resolves the issue. The PSAs may also take effect immediately if the situation at 
the foreign port creates an immediate threat to safety and security of vessels, crews, and 
passengers. Only when the Secretary deems it appropriate can a PSA be cancelled and the 
affected foreign country be removed from the PSA list13. These PSAs are intended to coerce 
foreign governments into complying with the international security standards established by the 
IMO. 
12 Public Law 107-295 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (also from GPO) 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ295/pdf/PLAW-107publ295.pdf 
13 Public Law 107-295 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (also from GPO) 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ295/pdf/PLAW-107publ295.pdf 
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Geopolitical Implications 
Nigeria 
Nigeria is bordered by Benin, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon with an 853 km coastline. The 
country is divided into 36 states, with one Federal Capital Territory. Nigeria is the most populous 
country in Africa, nearing 170 million people. Demographically, it is composed of more than 
250 ethnic groups; the most populous and politically influential are: Hausa and the Fulani 29%, 
Yoruba 21%, Igbo (Ibo) 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%, Tiv 2.5%. This has allowed 
for a diverse religious makeup, primarily divided between Christianity in the South and Islam in 
the North, with a variety of other religious followings throughout. It is also home to the largest 
economy on the continent with an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of $1.1 trillion USD 
in 201514. 
That being said, Nigeria’s economy is one based very heavily on petroleum and oil 
production. Nigeria entered OPEC in 1971. Recently, OPEC countries have been facing 
economic issues relating to the substantial downturn in oil prices. Not only that, but the US was 
the largest importer of Nigerian oil up to 2012, bringing in approximately $22.3 billion in oil 
imports that year. This was a substantial part of Nigeria’s economy before the recent surge in US 
petroleum and natural gas production. By 2015 the US had decreased annual imports of oil down 
to only $1.9 billion15. This economic strain on the government has only been compounded by 
internal issues and political strife.  
Nigeria’s recent 2015 election of Muhammadu Buhari, a self-proclaimed reformed 
dictator now democrat, may cause the country to undergo drastic political changes as it 
14 Central Intelligence Agency. 2016. The World Factbook - Nigeria. Retrieved 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html) 
15 Skills, UK Department for Business Innovation and. n.d. “International Trade in Goods Based on UN Comtrade 
Data.” Retrieved December 8, 2016 http://comtrade.un.org/labs/BIS-trade-in-goods . 
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transitions to a democracy16. The Department of State (DoS) noted that Nigeria “faces 
formidable challenges in consolidating democratic order, including terrorist activities, sectarian 
conflicts, and public mistrust of the government. Nigeria has yet to develop effective measures to 
address corruption, poverty, and ineffective social service systems, and mitigate the violence17. 
Buhari ran on a platform of anti-corruption, advocating for defeat over Boko Harem. As of 2015, 
Nigeria has become one of the ten nonpermanent members of the UN Security Council, but 
problems with terrorist activity currently persist.  
Boko Haram emerged in the region in 2002. They operate on Chaos theory, hoping to 
establish an African Islamic State. They want to destabilize the Nigerian government and any 
Western influences. Boko Haram literally translates to “Western education is forbidden.” They 
were originally aligned with Al Qaeda, but have since pledged allegiance to ISIS. They are a 
major threat to Nigerian security, and are moving towards being capable of increasing the 
spreading violence throughout neighboring regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. By November of 
2013 the DoS had designated Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Although, the 
group has not been able to project force into Western countries, the intensification of their 
operations since 2013 has evolved the group to become a major terrorist threat to stability and 
security in region. Moving to 2014, Nigeria “witnessed the largest increase in terrorist deaths 
ever recorded by any country, increasing by over 300 percent to 7,512 fatalities”18. This upsurge 
in activity pushed Boko Haram to become the most deadly terrorist group in the world. They 
16 Smith, David. 2015. “Muhammadu Buhari: Reformed Dictator Returns to Power in Democratic Nigeria.” The 
Guardian, March 31. Retrieved December 8, 2016 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/31/muhammadu-buhari-military-dictator-nigeria-new-
democratic-president). 
17 Anon. 2016c. “U.S. Relations with Nigeria.” U.S. Department of State. Retrieved December 7, 2016 
(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm). 
18 Institute for Economics & Peace. n.d. Global Terrorism Index Report 2015. Retrieved 
http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2015-Global-Terrorism-Index-Report.pdf 
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have committed multiple human rights violations, and utilized tactics such as vehicle rigged 
IEDs on civilians. The group performed numerous large tactical assaults on villages, but the 
attention of the western world has grown substantially since they kidnapped over 300 school 
girls in the Chibok Abduction in April of 2014. Boko Haram's indiscriminate targeting of men, 
women and children continues to highlight the group's senseless brutality19. By May 15, 2014 
Nigeria declared a state of emergency due to the continuous conflicts, but their role in the 
suppression of these conflicts caused great concern abroad. Securing foreign assistance has been 
problematic, as just a year earlier the DoS released a report noting credible allegations that 
Nigerian security forces had been committing gross human rights violations (Kerry 2013). By 
May 22, 2014, the UN Security Council listed Boko Haram as a security threat (Anon 2014a). 
The group executed another series of attacks in early January 2015, leaving as many as 2,000 
dead in their wake. They are currently confined primarily to the Northern region of Nigeria, but 
they have been moving into neighboring countries, such as Chad and Cameroon. These countries 
have since reinvested in the Multinational Joint Task Force, which consists of forces from Benin, 
Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. This task force is aimed to counter and suppress Boko 
Haram, but the conflict continues. Currently, the DoS is providing approximately $71 million 
worth of equipment, logistics support, and training to the MNJTF signatory countries, including 
Nigeria, but this is not the only regional group of concern that may hinder foreign relations and 
trade (Anon 2016b). 
Another militant movement has emerged in Nigeria around the southern coast. Since the 
emergence of the group known as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 
                                                          
19 Kirby, John. 2015. “The United States Condemns Boko Haram Attacks in Cameroon and Nigeria.” U.S. 
Department of State. Retrieved December 7, 2016 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/08/246644.htm). 
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around 2006, they have been to blame for the steady rise in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The 
group emerged as a localized militant organization to combat overseas oil interests and 
government corruption, which has led to numerous attacks on oil industry vessels and assets. 
Although MEND had an overarching objective, high unemployment was partially to blame for 
the uprising. Of Nigeria's 170 million over 62% people live in extreme poverty20. In 2009 the ex-
president enacted an amnesty program with stipends, which pushed MEND to become mostly 
defunct.  
Since then, continuous levels of high youth unemployment, along with other regional 
socioeconomic, and ethnic issues have fueled the emergence of another militant presence aimed 
to hinder foreign oil interests, known as the Niger Delta Avengers. These continuous attacks on 
trade and foreign interests have greatly hindered trade relations. In June, of 2013 Shell 
announced it was going to review operations in Nigeria21. This emigration of industrial resources 
had a direct effect on Nigeria’s production capabilities throughout the year. News reports from 
mid-2016 indicate the group “targeted major platforms belonging to Shell and Chevron in the past 
few weeks, and its attacks have driven the country’s oil output to a near 22-year low”22. Due to the 
prevalence of these attacks, compounded continuous piracy, which plagues the Gulf of Guinea, 
the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency has had to enhancing trade security 
operations.  
20 Central Intelligence Agency. 2016. The World Factbook - Nigeria. Retrieved 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html 
21 Anon. 2014b. “Stakes in Four Nigerian Oil Fields Being Sold by Shell.” Nigeria Sun, August 28. Retrieved ( 
http://www.nigeriasun.com/index.php/sid/225153307 . 
22 Quenot, P. 2016. Rise of New Rebel Groups, Backed by Local Ethnic and Separatist Movements  Risk to 
Transform Oil Producing Niger Delta Regions into Hotbed of Insurgency. European Strategic Intelligence 
and Security Center. Retrieved http://www.esisc.org/upload/publications/briefings/rise-of-new-rebel-
groups-backed-by-local-ethnic-and-separatist-movements-risk-to-transform-oil-producing-niger-
deltaregions-into- a-hotbed-of-insurgency/Niger%20Delta%20Avengers%20-%20May%202016%20(2).pdf 
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The country has potential to prevail. Similar to up and coming BRICS countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa), economists predict that Nigeria may be part of another 
set of economically developing countries known as MINT, which symbolizes Mexico, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, and Turkey23. After meeting newly elected Federal Republic of Nigeria President 
Buhari in early 2016, Secretary John Kerry “noted Nigeria’s potential to enhance its agricultural 
production and infrastructure, and the potential of these industries to generate more employment 
opportunities, especially for Nigerian youth”24. This may be essential for a country, whose 
economy has been reliant on fluctuating, oil-based trade. The country has much room for 
improvement, but is moving in that direction. 
Nigeria’s health care system has been on the rise. Although Ebola made its mark on the 
country, it was the first country to contain and eliminate the threat. Unlike the situation in 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, all identified contacts were physically monitored on a daily 
basis for 21 days (WHO). The Nigerian Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), the Nigeria Field 
Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Programme and the State Ministry of Health, assisted by 
WHO, were very successful at quickly identifying issues. Even though their analysis revealed an 
alarming number of high-risk individuals near Port Harcourt, this allowed authorities to 
effectively mitigate issues before any further problems could emerge. Trade may have been 
slightly affected by these outbreaks, but piracy throughout the coast may have had a more 
significant impact on trade. Collaborations between the Nigerian Ports Authority and Port of 
Antwerp in Belgium, which is the second biggest port in Europe, have been helping to improve 
                                                          
23 Anon. 2014c. “The Mint Countries: Next Economic Giants?” BBC News, January 6. Retrieved December 8, 2016 
(http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25548060). 
24 Anon. 2016a. “Secretary Kerry’s Meeting with Federal Republic of Nigeria President Buhari.” U.S. Department 
of State. Retrieved December 7, 2016 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/03/255383.htm). 
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port related issues throughout the country. Until underlying socioeconomic issues are addressed, 
such as the high levels of unemployment, piracy and other targeted attacks on foreign interests 
may not concede. 
Senegal 
Geography  
Senegal is a country in West Africa, bordered by The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mali, Mauritania, and the Atlantic Ocean. The Gambia is actually almost completely enveloped 
within Senegal. Senegal has a total land area of 196,722 square kilometers. The terrain is 
generally plains with foothills in the southeastern region of the country. The climate is hot and 
humid with a rainy season from May to November and a dry season from December to April. 
Fish, phosphates, and iron ore are among the most abundant natural resources in Senegal. About 
43.8% of Senegal is forested land, and another 46.8% is agricultural land25.  
The capital of Senegal is Dakar, which is located near the western shore. It is currently 
the political capital, as well as a diverse cultural center and popular tourist destination26.  
History 
Senegal used to be part of several ancient kingdoms and empires, including the Ghana 
and Djolof kingdoms before European contact27. During the era of colonization, Senegal became 
a French colony. In 1960, Senegal gained its independence from France and formed a democratic 
government28. In 1960, the United States established diplomatic relations with Senegal after it 
25 Central Intelligence Agency. (2016). Senegal. The World Factbook. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html 
26 Camara, C., Clark,A., and Hargreaves, J. (2016). Senegal. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved  from 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Senegal. 
27 Camara, C., Clark,A., and Hargreaves, J. (2016). Senegal. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved  from
https://www.britannica.com/place/Senegal. 
28 Central Intelligence Agency. (2016). Senegal. The World Factbook. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html 
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gained independence29. Senegal has remained a firm ally of France and the United States, and 
has a history of participating in peacekeeping missions and interregional mediation efforts30. 
Senegal is a member nation of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
and the World Trade Organization31.  
Demographics  
Senegal’s population in 2016 was about 14,320,055. There are many ethnic groups in 
Senegal, with the largest being the Wolof, who comprise 38.7% of the population. The Pular 
make up 26.5%, the Serer make up 15%, and several other ethnic groups make up the rest. 
Senegal’s official language is French, although Wolof, Pulaar, Jola, and Mandinka are 
commonly spoken languages within their respective ethnic groups as well.  
Senegal has several religions among its population, however most people are Muslims. 
Over 95% of the population is Muslim, while only about 4.2% are Christian. There is also a 
small percentage of people in Senegal who practice animism.  
Since the 1989 border conflict with Mauritania, Senegal has taken in several thousand 
black Mauritanian refugees. Senegal has historically been a major destination for economic 
migrants, immigrants, and others.  
The largest percentage of the population in Senegal is young people. 41.85% of the 
population is 0-14 years of age, and another 20.36% of the population is 15-24 years of age. The 
29 US Department of State. (2016). US Relations with Senegal Fact Sheet. Bureau of African Affairs. Retrieved from 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2862.htm 
30 Central Intelligence Agency. (2016). Senegal. The World Factbook. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html 
31 US Department of State. (2016). US Relations with Senegal Fact Sheet. Bureau of African Affairs. Retrieved 
from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2862.htm 
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population is growing at a rate of 2.42%, with 34 births per 1,000 population, but only 8.3 deaths 
per 1,000 population32.  
Economy 
Senegal’s economy mainly relies on mining, construction, tourism, fisheries, and 
agriculture. Their main export industries are phosphate mining, production of fertilizer, and 
agricultural products (CIA 2016). Senegal relies heavily on imports and donor assistance. 
Senegal is operating under the Emerging Senegal Plan (ESP), a plan created by their current 
president to reform and improve the economy.  
Senegal’s gross domestic product (GDP) was approximately $36.69 billion USD in 2015, 
showing steady growth over the past few years.  
Senegal has a relatively high unemployment and poverty rate. The 2011 estimate showed 
46.7% of the population living below the poverty line. Unemployment rates reached 48% in 
2007.  
Senegal exports much less than they import. The 2015 estimates show $2.31 billion USD 
worth of exports, and $4.918 billion USD worth of imports to Senegal33.   
Security Issues 
The Casamance region in the southern part of Senegal had a history of violence since the 
1980s due to separatist groups34. The Gambia and Guinea Bissau have had issues with separatist 
32 Central Intelligence Agency. (2016). Senegal. The World Factbook. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html 
33 Central Intelligence Agency. (2016). Senegal. The World Factbook. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html 
34 US Department of State. (2016b). Senegal 2016 Crime and Safety Report. US Department of  State Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security. Retrieved from 
https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=19480. 
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violence, raids, and arms smuggling across their Senegalese borders35. In recent years however, 
violence and like kind activity has decreased slightly.  
In 2014, Senegal confirmed its first and only Ebola case, and quickly responded to the 
ensuing public health threat. The case was quickly closed and Senegal’s Ebola crisis ended 
quickly.  
The threat of terrorism is real, despite no direct terror attacks in Senegal. Although 
Senegal is fairly stable, other countries nearby are less stable, and there are many porous borders 
in the region36.  
Trade surrounding major events 
The first year of trade data available was 2007, which shows Senegal’s trade at 424,457 
TEUs. The next year, 2008, Senegal’s trade drops from 424,457 TEUs to 347,483 TEUs. This 
could potentially be explained by the elections Senegal saw in 2007, although it is unknown 
whether this is actually the case. President Abdoulaye Wade was elected in 2000 after 40 years 
of Socialist Party rule. He was reelected in 2007 to a second term and amended the Senegalese 
Constitution to give the executive branch more power. He ran for a third term in 2012, but was 
defeated by the current president, Macky Sall37. The trade in TEUs in 2012 was 396,822,455 
TEUs, much higher than in 2008, however, after Macky Sall’s election, trade grew significantly 
to 428,171,428 TEUS. Although trade in TEUs mostly rose from 2007-2014, these significant 
decreases and increases could be a result of the political atmosphere surrounding the elections.  
Cote D’Ivoire 
35 Central Intelligence Agency. (2016). Senegal. The World Factbook. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html 
36 US Department of State. (2016b). Senegal 2016 Crime and Safety Report. US Department of  State Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security. Retrieved from 
https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=19480. 
37  Central Intelligence Agency. (2016). Senegal. The World Factbook. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html 
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Geography 
Cote D’Ivoire is a country in western Africa, bordered by Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, 
Liberia, Mali, and the Atlantic Ocean. The total land area is 322,463 square kilometers. Cote 
D’Ivoire’s terrain is mostly flat plains with mountains in the northwest region of the country. The 
climate is tropical on the coast, semi-arid in the norther region, and there are generally three 
seasons throughout the year.  
There are a variety of natural resources found in Cote D’Ivoire, including petroleum, 
natural gas, diamonds, manganese, iron ore, cobalt, bauxite, copper, gold, nickel, and much 
more. Cote D’Ivoire’s land is 32.7% forested and 64.8% agricultural land.  
History  
In the era of colonization, Cote D’Ivoire became a French colony. Cote D’Ivoire gained 
their independence from France in 1960, after they became the most prosperous West African 
state due to their cocoa production exports.  
However, in 1999, a military coup overthrew the government and set off over a decade of 
turmoil and conflict. The Junta leader Robert Guei rigged the 2000 elections to win, but protest 
led to Laurent Gbagbo taking power. This led to a failed coup attempt in 2002 that led to civil 
war, which ended in 2003 with a ceasefire. In 2007, President Gbagbo compromised with the 
rebel resistance leader, Guillaume Soro, to integrate the rebels into the armed forces and have 
Soro join Gbagbo’s government. When the elections came around in 2010, Gbagbo lost and 
Alassane Dramane Ouattara won the presidential election. However, Gbagbo refused to give up 
power, leading to a standoff that only ended in 2011 after UN and French forces forced him from 
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office38. The United Nations and French peacekeeping forces have remained in Cote D’Ivoire 
since 2011 to assist President Ouattara in rebuilding Cote D’Ivoire after years of conflict. Former 
president Gbagbo is waiting to go to trial in The Hague for crimes against humanity39.  
The United States has a friendly relationship with Cote D’Ivoire and is committed to 
helping the country move beyond its history of conflict, restoring peace, and supporting a 
legitimate democratic government40.  
Demographics 
The population of Cote D’Ivoire is 23,740,424. There are many ethnic groups that make 
up the total population. Akan makes up 32.1% of the population, Voltaique or Gur makes up 
15%, Northern Mande makes up 12.4%, and many other groups comprise the rest. The official 
language is French, but over 60 native dialects are spoken. Cote D’Ivoire is also religiously 
diverse. Muslims make up 40.2% of the population, Catholics make up 19.4%, Evangelicals 
make up 19.3%, Christians make up 4.5%, and many other religions exist in small percentages.  
Most of Cote D’Ivoire’s population are younger people. The growth rate is 1.88%, with a 
birth rate of 28.2 births per 1,000 population, and a death rate of just 9.5 deaths per 1,000 
population41.  
Economy  
The economy of Cote D’Ivoire is dependent upon agriculture, where almost two-thirds of 
the population works. Cote D’Ivoire is the world’s largest producer of cocoa beans, and is a 
38 Central Intelligence Agency. (2016). Cote D’Ivoire. The World Factbook. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html 
39 Central Intelligence Agency. (2016). Cote D’Ivoire. The World Factbook. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html 
40 US Department of State. (2015). US Relations with Cote D’Ivoire Fact Sheet. Bureau of African Affairs. 
Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm. 
41 Central Intelligence Agency. (2016). Cote D’Ivoire. The World Factbook. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html 
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major producer of coffee and palm oil- meaning Cote D’Ivoire’s economy depends significantly 
upon the international demand and prices for these items. Since 2011, Cote D’Ivoire has 
experienced more foreign investment and has seen significant economic growth. 
The gross domestic product, or GDP, for Cote D’Ivoire is $78.62 billion USD, which is 
an increase from the last several years. They are also exporting more than they are importing. In 
2015, they exported $11.98 billion USD, but only imported $8.609 billion USD42.   
Security Issues 
There have been many security concerns due to Cote D’Ivoire’s long history of political 
conflict, insurgency, and civil war. This began in 1999 and was not stabilized until 2011.  
Trade Surrounding Major Events  
No trade data is available for Cote D’Ivoire in 1999, so it is difficult to know if the 
military coup affected trade in Cote D’Ivoire. However, trade data for the years during and after 
Gbagbo’s removal and Ouattara’s election is suggestive. In 2010, Cote D’Ivoire’s trade in TEUs 
was 607,730 TEUs. In 2011, it was 642,370.61 TEUs. In 2012 after the transfer of power, it was 
690,548.406 TEUs. By 2014, it was 783,101.918 TEUs, a large increase in trade compared to 
before the elections. This does not mean that the coup and elections affected trade, but it is 
suggestive that changes were occurring in the country at that time that did affect trade.  
42 Central Intelligence Agency. (2016). Cote D’Ivoire. The World Factbook. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html 
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Challenges and Issues 
Although some countries face different issues when it comes to port security, most 
countries face similar issues as well. All cargo going in and out of ports could be targeted by 
smuggling, terrorism and theft. As long as these threats still exists, port security will be a 
necessity. Organized crime groups exploit weaknesses in the security of each port in order to 
achieve their goal. Due to this, port security must remain of upmost importance.  
As crime and criminal activity evolves, security must evolve as well. For an example, 
crime does not just occur at the port of a country. Now, there is evidence of crime happening in 
the waters themselves as in the case of sea robbery. Port security must now regulate and protect 
land and water, which means more personnel, time and money. However, due to a lack in 
financial resources that most countries face, this can be a difficult task. Ports can hurt financially 
by direct loss due to crime and costs for hiring and training personnel. Some non-monetary costs 
that ports may see due to criminal activity are time loss due to time spent with police and 
attorneys, loss of life and loss in productivity. 
Besides financial resources acting has a hindrance to port security, coordination, 
cooperation and communication with international government can present barriers as well43. 
Multiple government agencies must work together in order to provide effective port security. 
Language barriers play a huge part in this hindrance.  
Besides present day challenges, it is important that ports look to the future and try to get 
morph and evolve in advance of coming challenges. The world is always changing and updating 
which in turn brings changes in technology and innovation. Having the most up to date 
technology will help improve security and access to the country’s port. However, with the 
43 US DOT, 1997 - http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/16000/16900/16918/PB2000106164.pdf 
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evolution of technology, countries must also be aware of hackers and criminals who can get into 
a ports system and send false communication in order to redirect cargo. In order to help fight 
against this type of crime, the United Nations World Ministerial Conference on Organized 
Transnational Crime drafted recommendations to protect their technology. 
As with other aspects of the world, privatization has become more and more popular. 
Privatization of ports increases productivity and decreases handling times in cargo handling and 
ship turnaround. Competition has also decreased port fees and increased supply. However, with 
privatization comes its own set of issues and complications. Privatization has seen relaxation of 
controls and fewer cargo inspections, meaning it is now easier to smuggle illegal items from 
these ports. 
When thinking about security in general, say in terms of TSA at an airport, it is easier to 
handle issues and be more thorough when the amount of people in the airport is manageable. 
When the airport gets crowded with people, it creates a more hectic environment for TSA to 
manage. The same can be said for port security. When there is congestion at the port, security 
must be prepared to deal with any and all issues, especially criminal, resulting for this 
congestion. A common government response to congestion in a port is to relax customs 
inspections in order to get the cargo out of the port faster44. As one can imagine, this creates 
issues in security as it allows more opportunities for unauthorized access to cargo and allows 
more opportunity for criminals to smuggle in items such as drugs or weapons.  
Many ports have a “worst case scenario” report. For an example, the Port of Savannah 
released its report stating that if a nuclear device was sent by shipping container and it exploded, 
it would destroy both the port itself and over 60,000 people would die immediately. Not only 
44 US DOT, 1997 - http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/16000/16900/16918/PB2000106164.pdf 
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would this be devastating due to loss of life, but it would also cause environmental disaster and a 
disruption in economy, both in the United States and in the rest of the world.  It is important to 
remember that ports are an attractive location for any terrorist attack. Taking into account all the 
damage that can be done to a port and the effects on that country and the rest of world, terrorists 
would be willing to do anything to destroy a port.  
What prompts a PSA? 
In an effort to restrict terrorism or smuggling of illegal items into the United States, the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act mandated that the United States Coast Guard evaluate the 
effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in foreign ports and monitor shipments that come in 
from these countries. Since the Coast Guard is in charge of maintaining the security in the ports 
of the United States, it is up to them to monitor who is allowed to send shipments to the US 
based on these inspections of other countries ports. If a port is deemed ineffective, a PSA is then 
given to the country. 
After 9/11, the International Maritime Organization added the International Ship and Port 
Facilities Security Code to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea which gives 
agencies a foundation for deciding which ports allow potential threats and vulnerability of the 
ships that dock there45.  
What does a PSA mean for that country? 
Those countries that do not pass inspection of anti-terrorism measures will receive a PSA, 
or a Port Security Advisory, letting the country know which of its ports are not up to par in their 
security measures. Furthermore, the PSA will tell the country what these ports need to do in 
45 Lundquist, E. (2011) “International Port Security Program: The Coast Guard’s watchful eye  monitors security 
of ports Overseas. Defense Media Network. March. Retrieved from 
http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/international-port-security-program/ 
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order to be able to ship into the United States. A re-inspection can be conducted in an effort to 
lift the PSA on those ports.  
Not only are the PSAs given to the country, but they are accessible to the public so that 
we know whose ports are not maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures46. In addition to the 
country receiving the PSA, the Coast Guard, with the Department of State, will mandate that the 
country establish training programs to assist the countries in their security efforts. Additionally, 
if a PSA issue has not been rectified and the country removed from the list, then that country will 
appear on the next announcement. For this reason, quantifying PSAs is done by the count of the 
periods the PSA has been active, not by the count of the “number” of PSAs for a given country. 
Current Actions 
The Port Security Program is designed to reduce risk to U.S. maritime interests, including 
U.S. ports and ships. The goal is to have confidence in the effectiveness of a ports 
implementation of the ISPS Code and for the maritime security standards and security measures 
to not only meet the requirement, but to exceed the minimum requirements of the ISPS Code. 
The U.S. Coast Guard has liaison officers all over the world in the trading nations. These officers 
are to report and communicate with their respective Embassies, maritime professionals, port 
officials, port security, and other government authorities.  
When the Coast Guard visits a country they meet with the ISPS Code Designated 
Authority, visit the ports, and meet with the U.S. Embassy to discuss and coordinate their 
efforts.47 There are many different factors that the Coast Guard uses when enforcing and 
46 Lundquist, E. (2011) “International Port Security Program: The Coast Guard’s watchful eye monitors security 
of ports Overseas. Defense Media Network. March. Retrieved from 
http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/international-port-security-program/ 
47 USCG Activities Far East. (n.d.). Retrieved November 17, 2016, from 
https://www.uscg.mil/d14/feact/Security.asp 
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implementing the ISPS Code. For one, they use the Port Security Risk Assessment Tool. This is 
to enable users to assess terrorism risks within their area. Another major focus is access control. 
Not all practices are used at each facility, but some methods are Biometric cards used to access 
facility, done by the Port of Buenaventura, Columbia, or color changing visitor ID badges, as 
used by AC Auckland, New Zealand. Electronic surveillance is highly advanced as well. In 
Kandia, India they use portable explosive vapor detectors, which allows guards to use the 
machine to test for chemicals associated with weapons. Other methods have been 24 hours per 
day security guards, water patrols, better lighting towers, and improved perimeter control. In the 
Ports of Arsew and Bethious in Algeria there are guards stationed at the gas transfer pier twenty-
four hours a day.48 These are just some of the current actions taken today by various ports 
regarding port security. If the ISPS team or Coast Guards realize that the port security measures 
are not being followed, then they will work with the country to identify actions that are needed to 
be made to correct and achieve compliance. If the conditions are not met in the next ninety days, 
then ships arriving in the U.S. from that port may see a delay in cargo operations or denial of 
entry. 49  
Based on looking at the PSAs issued to our countries of study, it appears that the current 
actions do not have a strong impact. In Liberia, there have been PSAs for nearly every period. In 
Cote D’Ivoire and Nigeria the PSAs have come in recent years. Nigeria had much lower numbers 
in terms of export and import before the year 2004, when they received their first PSA. In the 
years since the numbers have gone up, but it is still to be seen what the numbers will be in the 
future since Nigeria have has PSAs issued against them since 2014. As for Cote D’Ivoire, their 
48 US Coast Guard Home Port. (n.d.). Retrieved November 17, 2016, from 
http://homeport.uscg.mil/mycg/portal/ep/home.do 
49 Lawrence, J. A. (n.d.). International Port Security Program (ISPS): Global Implementation of International 
Maritime Security Standards. 6-7. Retrieved November 17, 2016. 
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import and export numbers are roughly the same, maybe slightly higher after receiving their first 
PSAs. It is hard to tell if the use of PSAs and the consequences of failing to comply is really 
working and deterring countries from breaking the rules.  
Recommendations/Best Practices  
Throughout the statistical analysis we found PSAs to be ineffective. The data is not being 
reported correctly and there is not a checks and balance system on making sure the correct 
numbers are being presented. As mentioned previously, there are many concerns when it comes 
to securing ports around the world. Although it may be improbable that all security issues will be 
fixed, the government should strive to fix or improve as many issues as possible. If the 
government was to release best practices for port security and response to threats, each country 
would have a framework to follow on where their security should be focused.  
Recommendation #1- A way to increase the likelihood of PSAs being effective would be 
to track the trade other countries are reporting with the country that has been issued the PSAs. 
Sanctions on these countries that are willing to trade with countries who have been flagged could 
decrease the amount of under the table and illegal trade that is happening.  
Recommendation #2- Countries with rare natural resources need to be regulated more 
closely than countries without them. These types of resources show a much higher chance of 
trade partners engaging in illegal trade50. Tracking of where resources came from in countries 
that do not produce those resources themselves could also be a way of cutting down on illegal 
trade. If a country has several ores that they do not produce, then it is likely they received them 
from someone who has been sanctioned and that is a way of tracking their illegal trade activities. 
50 Feldman, D. L. (2003). “Conflict Diamonds, International Trade Regulation, and the Nature of  Law”. University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law. 24:4. 835-874. 
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Recommendation #3-Lastly, it is a well-known fact that numbers are not being reported 
accurately. It should be required to utilize a standard application to track and report trade 
volumes, and if it is not done accurately, sanctions should be handed down. When it comes to 
technology, countries have a wide variety of accessibility. Wealthier countries may use the most 
expensive (most accurate) technology to track shipments where less fortunate countries may be 
forced to use less reliable technology. These different technologies may not be compatible, 
meaning the information that one country has may not be able to share it with another country 
because their technology will not be able to receive it, essentially making the information 
useless.  
In addition to improving the effectiveness of the PSA process, we find there are 
numerous actions that could be taken to prevent PSAs from needing to be issued at all. Reducing 
that administrative burden would be the first step.  
Recommendation #4- Develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) to ensure that port 
security and other personnel are prepared to effectively respond to any situation. These SOPs 
could be disseminated by the International Maritime Organization to all participating nations. 
Along those same lines, it is important that those security agents are able to remain calm during a 
response in an effort to limit any panic in the port, both of the government and of the citizens.  
Recommendation #5- Develop standard operating procedures for emergency responses. 
When dealing with large ports, or several ports in one cluster, response to an emergency can be a 
daunting task. For instance, consider the ports in Los Angeles and Long Beach; where multiple 
emergency response agencies would be involved in responding to a disaster. In fact, 15 different 
federal, state and local agencies would respond if an issue was to arise at one, or both, of these 
ports. While having so many trained personnel would be helpful; no one particular agency would 
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be completely in charge if a disaster or terrorist attack were to occur making coordination a 
logistical challenge.  One possible solution would be to create a security committee, to 
coordinate responses at locations with port in close proximity. In this committee, representatives 
from certain key agencies would create a plan that would provide for better coordination. This 
committee would communicate the appropriate chain of command for emergency response.  
Recommendation #6- Focus on threat prevention. A container of goods makes 
approximately 17 different stops along the way in making it to its destination country51. At many 
of these stops, the container is at rest, making it accessible for criminals to get into, especially if 
the container is only closed and not sealed. Maintaining consistent oversight of containers in 
transit decreases the active threat, therefore reducing the burden of security in port and the PSA 
issuance and review process. 
51 Haveman, J.D., Shatz, H.J. (2006). Protecting the Nation’s Seaport: Balancing Security and  Cost.  Public 
Policy Institute of California. Retrieved from  
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_606JHR.pdf. 
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Conclusion: 
As we have seen throughout comparing PSAs and the effect they have on various ports 
throughout the world, the results are not always as clear as would be hoped. Comparing trade 
between countries confined to the continent of Africa seemed to be a fantastic way of narrowing 
down trade data into one specific population; but once that trade data is studied more in depth it 
is not as simple as it seems. Africa is still a very large continent and comparing two ports is not 
always like comparing New York and New England and more like comparing Miami and 
Anchorage. The hypothesis that PSAs are not effective in decreasing trade appears to be proven 
when looking at the statistical data collected.  
However, PSAs appear to have an effect on trade under certain circumstances 
within Liberia. Liberia, a country with 28 periods of open PSAs left unresolved, presents 
incomplete or faulty trade data suggesting some reduction took place52. The question becomes 
whether or not the case is truly that they are not trading goods or that they are just not reporting 
the trade that is happening. But, Cote D’Ivoire, another country that spent a large amount of time 
with PSAs left unresolved from 2011 to March of this year, continued to report all their data. 
Using Cote D’Ivoire as a model, there was no significant negative change; in fact, there was a 
steady gain throughout those years53. This leads us to believe that the trade is not being affected, 
it is just being underreported. Regulations do not seem to be taken seriously, which is a scary 
thought especially with the likelihood of attack in this day and age.  
The effects of PSAs become even less apparent when a country such as Sierra 
Leone is compared with a country like Ghana. Ghana has not been issued a PSA and has had a 
52 Table 1 
53 Table 12 
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steady growth rate of import and exports over the past 15 years54. Sierra Leone was issued PSAs, 
then resolved them, then with new ones issued on multiple occasions has not reported much trade 
data at all. But, by researching what other countries have reported with Sierra Leone, a 
completely different story emerges. We found that trade increased from 2001 to 2002 by 
approximately 20% in Sierra Leone55. There was no PSA issued before this so a major reason for 
the change appears to be the ending of the Civil War, plus a mining community development 
fund, that returns a portion of diamond export taxes to diamond mining communities. That raised 
the local communities’ stakes in diamonds and gave them a reason to market their diamonds to 
legitimate trade rather than diamond smugglers56.  
The period we looked for from the issuance of Sierra Leone’s first PSA was from 2003 to 
2004. From the countries that reported trade with Sierra Leone, it was actually determined that 
there was almost a similar trade value between the two years. Since the end of the civil war in 
2002 Sierra Leone’s economy profoundly recovered with a GDP growth rate between 4 and 
7%. The issue with issuing a PSA to a country like Sierra Leone is that their most important 
exports are 29% diamonds and 14%, both of which are highly desirable. These are rare and 
valuable commodities and issuing PSAs does not diminish other countries’ interest in obtaining 
these resources. 
Another possibility for the skewed trade data is that many of the countries have 
underreported trade. The rationale for this may be that many of these countries have sanctions on 
their trade due to the PSAs, which forces them to engage in illegal trade. The question is then 
proposed: are PSAs then more of an encouragement for illegal trade?  Does the issuance of PSAs 
54 Table 18 
55 Table 22 
56 Feldman, D. L. (2003). “Conflict Diamonds, International Trade Regulation, and the Nature of  Law”. University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law. 24:4. 835-874. 
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actually force countries who worked to create safer ports, into illegal trade causing an unsafe 
trade environment and increasing the likelihood of terrorist activity? The data suggests a 
correlation between countries who have PSAs and the lack of reporting trade data, some of it 
becoming illegal trade.  
 An example of illegal trade is the illegal seafood imports to the United States. In 
an article estimating the illegal and unreported fish in seafood imports to the US the authors 
found that the illegal trade is estimated between $1.3 and $2.1 billion57. The authors discovered 
that between 20%-32% of wild-caught seafood trade is illegal, likely because of altered chain of 
custody documents which facilitate these products into US markets. This same method could be 
used to import any product illegally. They also stated that another method used is the large 
number of opaque supply chain companies. There are so many products being moved that it is 
very difficult to validate every item being moved. If ports that have a PSA currently issued and 
wish to get a product shipped, it is definitely not unheard of that documents are altered. This is 
just one possibility from a large variety of reasons why trade may not be reported properly. 
 However, correlation may not imply causation. Just because a country shows a large drop 
in trade or in gain in trade in a certain year does not mean the PSA issued or not issued caused 
that. Many of these countries are third world and there are a variety of economic reasons behind 
a change of data. While PSAs may cause inconvenience and create the need for countries to go 
around the regulations and sanctions that are placed on them, they are not working to prevent 
these countries from doing so58. Many of these countries, especially in Africa, have significant 
                                                          
57 Pramoda, G., Nakamurab,K., Pitchera,T.J., Delagranc,L. (N.D.) “Estimates of illegal and unreported fish in 
 seafood imports to the USA”. Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada V6T 
 1Z4. 
58 Feldman, D. L. (2003). “Conflict Diamonds, International Trade Regulation, and the Nature of  Law”. University 
 of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law. 24:4. 835-874. 
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goods that cannot be obtained anywhere else in the world. While the PSA regulations create 
restrictions on the ports within their country, they do not account for other countries who work 
with the governments to get these products in by other ways.  
Future research that could be beneficial to measure effectiveness of PSAs would be to 
study countries that do not have highly valuable trade commodities. Let us say for example that 
Australia had nothing available for trade that could not be found elsewhere in the world. Then, 
Sydney was issued several PSAs for lack of anti-terrorism measures. The hypothesis would be 
that their trade would drop drastically, because the countries that trade with them would be able 
to acquire the same product elsewhere without having to deal with the PSAs. 
 Throughout the statistical analysis we found PSAs to be ineffective. The data is not 
being reported correctly and there is not a serious check and balance to make sure the correct 
numbers are being reported. A way to increase the likelihood of PSAs being effective would be 
to track the trade other countries are reporting with the country that has been issued the PSAs. 
Sanctions on these importing countries who are willing to trade with countries who have been 
flagged with PSAs could decrease the amount of illegal trade also59. Countries with rare natural 
resources need to regulated more closely than countries without them. These types of resources 
show a much higher probability of trade partners engaging in illegal trade. Tracking of where 
resources came from into countries that do not produce those resources themselves could also be 
a way of cutting down on illegal trade. All of this helps paint a little better “common operating 
picture” of the effectiveness of PSAs.  
59 Feldman, D. L. (2003). “Conflict Diamonds, International Trade Regulation, and the Nature of  Law”. University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law. 24:4. 835-874. 
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Table 1: Open PSA periods by Country 
Port Security 
Advisory # Date Benin
Cote 
D'ivoire Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Senegal
Sierra 
Leone Togo Total
1-04 9-Sep-04 5
2-04 1-Oct-04 4
3-04 9-Nov-04 3
4-04 29-Dec-04 2
2-05 20-May-05 1
3-05 30-Aug-05 1
1-06 24-Jan-06 1
1-07 21-Nov-07 1
1-08 25-Feb-08 1
2-08 6-Mar-08 1
5-08 11-Apr-08 1
6-08 12-Jun-08 1
7-08 24-Oct-08 1
1-09 16-Jan-09 1
7-09 1-Sep-09 1
10-09 20-Nov-09 1
3-10 14-Apr-10 1
2-11 5-Apr-11 1
3-11 27-May-11 2
4-11 14-Oct-11 2
1-12 5-Sep-12 2
2-12 27-Nov-12 2
2-14 12-Jun-14 3
3-14 15-Sep-14 3
1-15 25-Mar-15 3
2-15 13-Apr-15 3
3-15 22-Jun-15 3
1-16 17-Mar-16 3
Total 4 10 0 2 28 7 0 3 0
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Table 2: PSAs Issued by Open Period 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: PSAs Issued by Open Period 
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Table 4: Port list-Selected Countries 
Country # of Ports Port Name 
Cote 
D’ivoire 
4 ports Espoir Terminal 
Port Bouet Tanker Terminal 
Port of Abidjan 
Port of San Pedro 
Guinea 2 Ports Port of Port Kamsar 
Port of Conakry 
Senegal 4 Ports Port of Dakar 
Port of Kaolack 
Port of Lyndiane 
Port of Ziquinchor 
Liberia 4 Ports Port of Cape Palmas 
Port of Greenville 
Port of Buchnan 
Port of Monrovia 
Sierra 
Leone 
3 ports Port of Freetown 
Port of Pepel 
Port of Sherbro 
Table 5: Nigeria v. Algeria Global Trade 
Country # of Ports Port Name 
Benin 1 port Port of Cotonou 
Ghana 2 ports Tem a Port 
Takoradi Port 
Togo 2 ports Port of Lome 
Port of Kpeme 
Nigeria 6 ports Lagos Port Complex 
Tin Can Island Port Complex 
Rivers Port Complex 
Delta Ports Complex 
Calabar Port Complex 
Onne Port Complex 
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 Table 6: Nigeria v. Algeria US Trade 
 
 
Table 7: Beninese Imports 
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Table 8: Nigerian Global Trade 
Nigeria Global Trade Report 
Year Export (in Billions 
USD) 
Import (in 
Billions USD) 
Container port traffic 
(TEU: 20 foot equivalent 
units) 
2001 18 8 
2002 18.6 8.8 
2003 24.1 14.9 588,478 
2004  512,610 
2005 
2006 59.2 22.9 
2007 54 32.4 
2008 81.8 28.2 72,500 
2009 49.9 33.9 87,000 
2010 86.6 44.2 101,007 
2011 125.6 64 839,907 
2012 143.2 35.9 877,679 
2013 90.6 44.6 1,010,836 
2014 102.9 46.5 1,062,389 
Table 9: Nigerian/US Trade 
Nigeria US Trade Report 
Year Export (in Billions USD) Import (in Billions USD) 
2001 7.3 822.8 MM 
2002 5.8 1.1 
2003 9.2 2.3 
2004 
2005 
2006 26.7 3.6 
2007 25.2 4.9 
2008 34.8 2.3 
2009 13.6 2 
2010 29.8 7.9 
2011 28.3 11.5 
2012 24.1 4.9 
2013 7.7 3.9 
2014 4 4.8 
42
Table 10: Algerian Global Trade 
Algeria Global Trade Report 
Year Export (in 
Billions USD) 
Import (in 
Billions USD) 
Container port traffic (TEU: 
20 foot equivalent units) 
2001 19.1 9.9 311,111 
2002 18.8 12 
2003 24.7 13.5 
2004 46 20.4 
2005 24.7 13.5 
2006 54.6 21.5 
2007 60.2 27.6 200,050 
2008 79.3 39.5 225,140 
2009 45.2 39.3 250,095 
2010 57.1 41 279,785 
2011 73.4 47.2 295,733 
2012 71.9 50.4 317,913 
2013 66 54.9 343,028 
2014 60.4 58.6 360,522 
2015 34.8 51.8 
Table 11: Algerian/US Trade 
Algeria US Trade Report 
Year Export (in Billions USD) Import (in Billions USD) 
2001 2.7 1 
2002 2.6 1.2 
2003 4.9 709.3 MM 
2004 7.6 1.1 
2005 10.6 1.4 
2006 14.9 1.4 
2007 18.1 2.1 
2008 19 2.2 
2009 10.4 2 
2010 13.8 2.1 
2011 15.1 2.2 
2012 10.8 1.8 
2013 5.3 2.4 
2014 4.8 2.9 
2015 2.2 2.7 
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Table 12: Cote D’Ivoire Global Trade 
Cote D’Ivoire Global Trade Report 
Year Export (in 
Billions USD) 
Import (in 
Billions USD) 
Container port traffic (TEU: 
20 foot equivalent units) 
2001 3.6 2.5 543,845 
2002 5 2.6 579,060 
2003 5.3 3.3 612,546 
2004 6.6 4.7 670,000 
2005 7.2 5.9 710,000 
2006 8.1 5.8 
2007 8.1 6.7 590,306 
2008 9.8 7.9 713,625 
2009 10.3 7 677,029 
2010 10.3 7.8 607,730 
2011 11 6.7 642,370 
2012 10.9 9.8 690,548 
2013 12.1 12.5 745,102 
2014 13 11.2 783,102 
2015 11.8 9.5 
Table 13: Cote D’Ivoire/ US Trade 
Cote D’Ivoire US Trade Report 
Year Export (in Millions USD) Import (in Millions USD) 
2001 272.7 133.8 
2002 374.7 89.8 
2003 389.9 114.1 
2004 669.2 133.7 
2005 1 bn 119.3 
2006 739.4 135.1 
2007 547.2 180 
2008 945.1 209.1 
2009 800.3 228.3 
2010 1.1 bn 235.7 
2011 1.3 bn 128.2 
2012 877.9 254.4 
2013 741 291.6 
2014 1.1 bn 385.9 
2015 962.1 417.4 
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Table 14: Senegalese Global Trade 
Senegal Global Trade Report 
Year Export (in 
Billions USD) 
Import (in 
Billions USD) 
Container port traffic (TEU: 
20 foot equivalent units) 
2001 782.4 MM 1.7  
2002 694.7 MM 2  
2003 1.2 2.4  
2004 1.3 2.8  
2005 1.5 3.5  
2006 1.5 3.7  
2007 1.5 4.9 424,457 
2008 2.2 6.5 347,483 
2009 2 4.7 331,076 
2010 2.2 4.8 349,231 
2011 2.5 5.9 369,137 
2012 2.5 6.4 369,822 
2013 2.7 6.6 428,171 
2014 2.8 6.5 450,008 
2015 2.6 5.6  
 
 
Table 15: Senegal/US Trade 
Senegal US Trade Report 
Year Export (in Millions USD) Import (in Millions USD) 
2001 2.5 71.9 
2002 1.1 35. 
2003 8.1 86.3 
2004 2.8 88.4 
2005 16.2 140.9 
2006 6.6 116.7 
2007 9.4 105.3 
2008 11 129.2 
2009 4.4 131.8 
2010 4.6 127.5 
2011 4.4 287.2 
2012 10 174.5 
2013 29.4 152.1 
2014 33.8 142.5 
2015 63.8 139 
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Table 16: Beninese Global Trade 
Benin Global Trade Report 
Year Export (in 
Millions USD) 
Import (in 
Millions USD) 
Container port traffic (TEU: 
20 foot equivalent units) 
2001 204.2 601.5 
2002 241.7 725 
2003 271.5 892 
2004 298.3 893.8 
2005 288.2 898.7 
2006 224.6 1 bn 
2007 274.4 1.6 bn 
2008 421.1 1.7 bn 300,000 
2009 425.3 1.5 bn 272,820 
2010 533.9 2.1 bn 316,744 
2011 388.6 2.1 bn 334,798 
2012 460.3 2.3 bn 359,908 
2013 602 2.9 bn 388,341 
2014 968.3 3.7 bn 408,146 
2015 625.6 2.5 bn 
Table 17: Beninese/US Trade 
Benin – US Trade Report 
Year Export (in Thousands USD) Import (in Millions USD) 
2001 147.7 26 
2002 358.9 21 
2003 739 25 
2004 285.4 18.2 
2005 124.4 9.8 
2006 179.7 14.4 
2007 162.5 77.9 
2008 483.2 34.9 
2009 205.5 38.3 
2010 105.3 46.3 
2011 312.7 45.9 
2012 1.9MM 41 
2013 3.3MM 161.8 
2014 11.7MM 235.6 
2015 4.4MM 80.7 
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Table 18: Ghana Global Trade 
Ghana Global Trade Report 
Year Export (in 
Billions USD) 
Import (in 
Billions USD) 
Container port traffic (TEU: 
20 foot equivalent units) 
2001 1.7 3.2 
2002 2.7 
2003 2.3 3.2 
2004 2.5 4.1 
2005 3.1 4.9 
2006 3.6 5.3 
2007 3.5 7.3 544,294 
2008 3.8 8.5 612,847 
2009 5.1 6.5 557,323 
2010 5.2 8.1 647,052 
2011 18.1 12.6 683,934 
2012 15.8 13.6 735,229 
2013 12.6 12.8 793,312 
2014 833,771 
2015 
Table 19: Ghana/US Trade 
Ghana – US Trade Report 
Year Export (in Millions USD) Import (in Millions USD) 
2001 120.8 216.2 
2002 202.3 
2003 67.7 225.8 
2004 66.7 362.8 
2005 83.5 345.6 
2006 106.3 352.3 
2007 83.9 555.8 
2008 108.1 653.5 
2009 100.8 522.9 
2010 102.8 1.1BN 
2011 444.9 1.3BN 
2012 296.7 1.6BN 
2013 362.2 1.3BN 
2014 
2015 
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Table 20: Guinea Global Trade 
Guinea Global Trade Report 
Year Export (in Millions USD) Import (in Billions USD) 
2001 574.9 600.8 
2002 525.4 666.5 
2003 
2004 628.7 955 
2005 795.7 1.6 bn 
2006 770.5 1.1 bn 
2007 1.1 bn 1.3 bn 
2008 1.4 bn 1.8 bn 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 1.8 bn 2.4 bn 
2014 1.9 bn 2.5 bn 
2015 1.6 bn 2.1 bn 
Table 21: Guinea/US Trade 
Guinea – US Trade Report 
Year Export (in Millions USD) Import (in Millions USD) 
2001 96.9 42.7 
2002 46.3 55.2 
2003 
2004 93.8 73.2 
2005 79.5 109.3 
2006 79.6 57.6 
2007 145.5 78.5 
2008 96.1 95.1 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 74 72.6 
2014 108.2 45.1 
2015 84.2 57.2 
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Table 22: Sierra Leone Global Trade 
Table 23: Sierra Leone/US Trade 
Sierra Leone Global Trade Report 
Year Export (in Millions USD) Import (in Millions USD) 
2001 
2002 41.4 352 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 279.3 2.1 bn 
2015 93.3 1.8 bn 
Sierra Leone – US Trade Report 
Year Export (in Millions USD) Import (in Millions USD) 
2001 
2002 425.6T 17.4 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 1.3 44.5 
2015 756 T 45.3 
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Table 24: Togo Global Trade 
Table 25: Togo/US Trade 
Togo Global Trade Report 
Year Export (in Millions USD) Import (in Millions USD) 
2001 220.2 355 
2002 250.6 405.3 
2003 494.6 568.4 
2004 389.6 557.8 
2005 359.9 592.6 
2006 
2007 280 787.1 
2008 562.8 1.2 bn 
2009 640.2 1.2 bn 
2010 648.3 1.2 bn 
2011 852.3 1.8 bn 
2012 960.9 1.7 bn 
2013 1.1 bn 2 bn 
2014 803.8 1.8 bn 
2015 671.9 1.7 bn 
Togo – US Trade Report 
Year Export (in Millions USD) Import (in Millions USD) 
2001 15.5 21.1 
2002 3.13 21 
2003 12.1 17 
2004 1.97 24.8 
2005 8.66 27.9 
2006 2.75 108 
2007 6.59 249 
2008 11.5 106 
2009 6.6 116 
2010 9.27 171 
2011 29.9 201 
2012 48.2 409 
2013 8.41 832 
2014 5.32 1.01 bn 
2015 
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Table 26: Nigeria Imports and Exports 2015 
 
Table 27: Algeria Imports and Exports 2015 
 
Table 28: Cote D’Ivoire Imports and Exports 2014 
 
Table 29: Senegal Imports and Exports 2015 
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Table 30: Benin Imports and Exports 2015 
Table 31: Ghana Imports and Exports 2013 
Table 32: Guinea Imports and Exports 2015 
Table 33: Sierra Leone Imports and Exports 2015 
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Table 34: Togo Imports and Exports 2014 
Source Data: 
Michigan State University. (2016) Global Edge TradeData: Your Source For Global Business 
Knowledge. http://globaledge.msu.edu/. 
Republic of Benin. (N.D.) National Institute of Economic Analysis and  Statistics (INSAE )  
http://www.insae-bj.org/ . 
Trading Economics. = (N.D). http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ 
The World Bank. (2016). Container port traffic (TEU: 20 foot equivalent units. Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IS.SHP.GOOD.TU 
United Nations. (2016). Comtrade Database https://comtrade.un.org/ 
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